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Political Influence
Abstract
It was suggested over ten years ago that new and different
perspectives needed to be applied to the Personnel/Human Resources
Management field in an effort to promote theory and(P/HRM)
research and expand our understanding of the dynamics underlying
P/HRM processes. Both theory and research are emerging which
characterize important decisions and activitiesP/HRM
substantially influenced opportunistic behaviorby of both
subordinates and supervisors. The purpose of the present review
is to systematically examine the P/HRM field from a political
influence perspective, reviewing existing theory and research and
discussing future directions.
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Personnel/Human Resources Management:
A Political Influence Perspective
The field of Personnel/Human Resources Management (P/HRM)
has evolved, over the years, from a largely record-keeping,
maintenance function to one of generally acknowledged strategic
importance to the organization (e.g., Butler, Ferris, & Napier,
1991; Rowland & Ferris, 1982). Furthermore, from a research
standpoint, P/HRM has advanced from a primarily atheoretical,
"problem-driven" discipline (i.e., research generated by the need
to solve real-world problems or address issues of major
importance to the practice of P/HRM), to one actively concerned
with both theoretical and methodological development. Over ten
years ago, Ferris (1980) called for alternative theoretical and
methodological perspectives on P/HRM efforts to advance our
understanding and promote theory and research. In recent years,
a number of different perspectives have been taken in the P/HRM
field, including economic/utility and international, as well as
the more macro-level organization theory and strategy
perspectives. Some of these perspectives have been examined and
reflected in previous Yearly Review articles (Fisher, 1989;
Mahoney & Deckop, 1986).
The purpose of this Yearly Review article is to examine the
P/HRM field from a political influence perspective; a perspective
that has been actively pursued in other fields, but has only
recently been suggested as a way of viewing the P/HRM field
(Ferris & King, 1990; Frost, 1989). A reasonably comprehensive
r-
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review is reported on theory and research concerning political
influence processes and how they emerge to affect key P/HRM
decisions and activities.
The Political Influence Perspective
Organizational scientists have developed different notions
of what constitutes political behavior, and these notions have
come from a number of different disciplines. Some have defined
politics in terms of the behavior of the interest groups to use
power to influence decision making (Pettigrew, 1973; Tushman,
1977), or through coalition-building and bargaining (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1980). Others have focused on the self-serving and
organizationally nonsanctioned nature of individual behavior in
organizations (e.g., Burns, 1961; Porter, 1976; Farrell &
Peterson, 1982; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Schein, 1977; Gandz &
Murray, 1980). still others have characterized organizational
politics as a social influence process with potentially
functional or dysfunctional organizational consequences (Allen,
Madison, porte~, Renwick, & Mayes, 1979; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt,
1989b; Porter, Allen, & Angle, 1981), or simply the management of
influence (Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1980).
While subscribing to aspects of several of these definitions,
Pfeffer (1981b) more directly established the linkage between
politics and power, and conceived of organizational politics as
"the study of power in action" (p. 7). Mintzberg (1983) referred
to politics as "individual or group behavior that is informal,
ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and above all, in the
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technical sense, illegitimate -- sanctioned neither by formal
authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise (though it
may exploit anyone of these)" (p. 172).
Yet other views of political influence have adopted a
decidedly more social psychological perspective, and have
conceptualized such influence as impression management, often
isolating on the particular tactic of ingratiation (e.g., Gardner
& Martinko, 1988; Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Ralston, 1985; Wortman
& Linsenmeier, 1977). Schlenker (1980), a leading impression
management theorist, has defined impression management as "the
conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are
projected in real or imagined social interactions" (p. 6).
Whereas the foregoing do not exhaust all possible definitions of
political influence, they provide a representative sample.
It appears to be of much less use, for purposes of this
article, to offer ,yet another definition of the politics
construct, than it is to capture the essence of and develop a
working notion of political influence that makes sense for our
examination of P/HRM decisions and activities. Consistent with
this objective, the notion of political influence as the
management of shared meaning adopted by Ferris, King, Judge, and
Kacmar (in press) is used in this article. This notion is
derived from Sederberg (1984), who believed politics consists of
any deliberate attempt to "create, maintain, modify, or abandon
shared meanings" (p. 7) among participants in social settings.
Rather than inherent properties of situations, meanings are the
--r--
f';
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result of our responses to those situations and our subsequent
interpretations. Whether more or less, we all have a say in the
interpretations of those events and some consensus forms, usually
legitimized by organizational symbols and myths. These "shared
meanings" then provide guidelines for future interpretations and
organizational behavior. The idea is to manage the meaning of
the situation to produce the outcomes desired.
According to Sederberg {1984}, all behavior is not political
since the emphasis is on deliberate attempts to control the
meanings shared by all. This omits non-deliberate behavior such
as routine or mindless activity and types of deliberate behavior
that are not specifically geared toward creating, maintaining, or
altering shared meanings. Characterizing political influence as
deliberate attempts to manage or control the meanings shared by
others provides an interesting opportunity to examine how
employees in organizations, as well as job applicants, use this
process to influence key human resource decisions. This
characterization is similar to the "managed thought" notion
proposed by Chatman, Bell, and Staw (1986) in their discussion of
the role of impression management in organizations.
Political Influence Tactics
A number and variety of different political influence
tactics have been identified and examined in organizational
research (Kipnis, Schmidt, & wilkinson, 1980; Porter et ai.,
1981; Schriesheirn & Hinkin, 1990; Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; YukI
& Falbe, 1990). However, it is probably most convenient, for the
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present purposes, to think of influence tactics as falling into
two categories: assertive tactics and defensive tactics.
Perhaps the best known assertive tactic is ingratiation.
Ingratiation can take a number of forms such as favor doing,
other enhancement (e.g., flattery), opinion conformity (i.e.,
expressing opinions similar to a focal other), or subservient
behavior (the "utility or humility") . other types of assertive
tactics involve self-promotion, or the act of bringing to light
one's personal accomplishments, characteristics, or qualities in
order to present oneself in the most favorable manner. Self
promotion can take at least two different forms, materializing as
entitlements or enhancements. Entitlements involve verbal claims
of responsibility for positive events or outcomes that have
occurred, even when one cannot actually be rightfully credited
with such outcomes. Enhancements refer to attempts to exaggerate
or make more of one's accomplishments than is justified. Thus,
the category of assertive influence tactics involves proactive
efforts to manipulate or manage images conveyed to important
others, and consequently to manage shared meanings. Most of our
research has focused on employee assertive tactics because this
category is more typical of the ways the dark side of politics is
played out in human resource systems, as we will see in the
following sections of the paper.
The other category of influence behaviors is defensive
tactics, and refers to more reactive attempts to circumvent
negative outcomes. For example, in situations of poor
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performance, employees may utilize tactics such as apologies,
excuses, justifications, or disclaimers in order to prevent
negative consequences (e.g., Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Taken
together, these two categories of influence tactics provide some
indication of the nature of political influence tactics in
organizations, and the diversified portfolio of techniques that
are brought to bear upon human resource systems and decisions.
Furthermore, not all influence behaviors are similarly perceived
or equally effective, as will be seen in the subsequent review of
empirical research.
The P/HRM Context: Antecedents of Political Behavior
Political behavior, like any other behavior in
organizations, does not operate in a vacuum. The use of
influence tactics is undoubtedly enhanced by some aspects of the
environment and suppressed by others. Past theoretical efforts
and empirical findings have suggested the existence of several
environmental antecedents to political influence behavior.
Ambiquitv and Formalization
Ferris et ale (1989b) have suggested that influence behavior
is more apt to occur in ambiguous environments. One way to
define ambiguity is the absence of information. When ambiguity
is high, the individual may have few clues in which to direct
their behavior. Absent clear behavioral cues, Ferris et ale
argued the greater the probability of furthering one's
self-interest by engaging in influence behavior. As Ferris et
ale have suggested, when the situation is ambiguous -- meaning
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that clear evaluation criteria do not exist -- reliance is often
placed on subjective criteria for personnel decisions. Given
Mintzberg's (1983) reference to the informal nature of political
behavior, ambiguous environments with reliance on the subjective
is an environment in which the use of influence tactics is likely
to flourish. For example, Gilmore and Ferris (1989a, 1989b),
discussing ambiguity in the context of the employment interview,
offered the interesting proposition that inexperienced
interviewers with little information about the job provide a
receptive forum for applicant influence behaviors.
The importance of ambiguity on the use of influence tactics
has been reinforced by the findings from several studies.
and Ferris (1990) found that ambiguity coupled with
Fandt
accountability led to greater management of information by
individuals. Closely related to ambiguity is the degree of
formalization in organizations. Formalized procedures in
organizations serve to reduce ambiguity in order to place closer
controls on behavior. Thus, in highly formalized organizations
individuals would be expected to be less likely to perceive that
their influence tactics would be effective. Mintzberg's (1983)
research demonstrated that political behavior was weakest in
formalized organizations. However, Ferris, Judge, and Rowland
(1990) found no significant relationship between perceived
formalization and the use of influence tactics.
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spatial Distance
Ferris et al. (1990) argued that one of the more important
situational determinants of influence behaviors may be spatial
distance, or the proximity in which subordinates work with their
supervisors. Ferris et al. hypothesized that the effect of
spatial distance is likely to depend on the type of influence
tactic employed. For tactics oriented toward the job (e.g.,
covering up a negative event), distance between the supervisor
and subordinate was thought to allow greater opportunity to enact
job-focused tactics beyond the watchful eye of the supervisor.
However, tactics oriented toward the supervisor (e.g.,
volunteering to help the supervisor with his or her tasks)
obviously require the supervisorts presencel Therefore,
decreased spatial distance was thought to promote the use of
supervisor-focused influence tactics. Ferris et al. found that
spatial distance did result in significantly greater use of
supervisor-focused tactics, but no significant decrease in the
use of job-foc~sedtactics.
Accountabilitv
Caldwell and at Reilly (1982) found that those having the
most responsibility were more likely to manage impressions. In a
sense, these individuals have the most to lose in terms of their
position power by not managing impressions. Further, Pfeffer
(1981a) argued that one way for high position holders to add to
their power base and perceived image is to present favorable
impressions. Fandt and Ferris (1990) found that accountability
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interacted with ambiguity in the management of impressions.
Those in conditions of high accountability and low ambiguity
manipulated information more.
Instrumentality
Ferris et al. (1989b) hypothesized that instrumentality was
an important determinant of influence behavior. Those
individuals perceiving an environment rewarding the use of
influence tactics are more likely to be inclined to use such
tactics. Conversely, those seeing little or even negative
reinforcements for influence behavior may understandably be
reluctant to use them. Janson and Von Glinow (1985) corroborated
this when they argued that political behavior is most likely to
occur when rewarded by the organization.
The nature of the environment in reinforcing political
behavior, in addition to shaping the use of influence tactics,
may also affect the way individuals perceive their environment.
Those who perceive the organization environment as hostile to the
use of influence behavior may see use of influence tactics as
threats to their careers. On the other hand, individuals
perceiving influence behavior as a means to enhance their career
are more likely to see influence as an opportunity. Ferris et
al. (1989b) argued that these politics perceptions, in turn, are
likely to affect the individual's behavior (e.g., withdrawal) in
the organization.
As suggested by Ferris et al. (1989b), the perceptions of
the instrumentality of influence behavior, or whether political
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influence is likely to be seen as an opportunity or threat,
probably is molded by how one's supervisor's influence behavior
is reinforced. Research by Weiss (1977, 1978) suggests that
employees often model the work values and management styles of
their supervisors. Given this, it stands to reason that when the
supervisors' behavior is instrumental in aChieving valued
outcomes, such behavior is more likely to occur.
The Role of Individual Differences
Just as the characteristics of the environment are likely to
explain variance in influence tactics, differences between
individuals also likely affect influence behavior. In fact, past
work in the impression management area has identified several
individual characteristics thought to affect influence behavior.
Self-Monitoring
Those who possess the desire to manage impressions will
undoubtedly require the ability to control their own behavior to
be successful. ,Self-monitoring is a personality construct that
concerns exactly this -- the ability of individuals to monitor
and control their behavior J(Snyder, 1987). The individual high
on self-monitoring is one who can carefully scan the environment
for social cues, and modify their behavior accordingly. This is,
obviously an important skill to the implementation of influence
tactics.
Self-monitoring has received some empirical attention.
Caldwell and 0' Reilly (1982), investigating situations in which
decision-makers were faced with failure, found that
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self-monitoring significantly predicted the extent to which they
engaged in opportunistic behaviors. Von Baeyer, Shirk, and Zanna
(1981) found that self-monitoring predicted impression management
tactics by applicants in the context of the interview. On the
other hand, Ferris et al. (1990) found that self-monitoring
showed sQme relationship with jOb-focused influence tactics, but
no relationship with supervisor-focused tactics. Finally, Fandt
and Ferris' (1990) results indicated that self-monitoring
significantly predicted the use of information manipulation,
particularly when accountability was high.
Self-Attention
Self-attention refers to the extent to which individuals
direct attention toward, rather than away from, themselves
(Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Those that direct attention away from
themselves can be expected to focus attention on others. Those
concerned with other's thoughts, in turn, might be more motivated
by this concern for others' impressions to manage these
impressions (Fenigstein, 1979). Unfortunately, no empirical data
is available on the role of self-attention in influence behavior.
Thus, it remains an important area for future research.
Social Anxietv
Social anxiety, as its name implies, represents the degree
to which individuals experience anxiety when in the presence of
others (Watson & Friend, 1969). A significant manifestation of
this anxiety is the fear of negative evaluations from others
(Leary, 1983). It is reasonable to expect that those fearing
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negative evaluations from others will tend to be more motivated
to manage these evaluations. Arkin, Appelman, and Burger (1980),
in a series of studies, demonstrated that individuals high in
social anxiety were more likely to attempt to present a favorable
image of themselves. Thus, it appears that individuals afraid of
negative evaluations by supervisors or co-workers may be more
likely to avoid negative impressions by managing them.
Machiavellianism
Machiavellians (Machs), after their namesake, are
individuals who will do most anything to enhance their
self-interests, including manipulation, lying, and exploiting the
misfortunes of others (Christie & Geis, 1970). These behaviors
obviously represent the dark side of influence behavior.
Research supports that high Machs are more likely to manage
impressions of others (Kauffmann & Steiner, 1968; Pandey, 1981;
Pandey & Rastogi, 1979). Touhey (1973) has argued that
Machiavellianism allows goal attainment only to those skillful
enough to conceal their underlying motives. Perhaps supporting
this hypothesis are results by Ferris et ale (1990) that found
that subtle behaviors such as volunteering to help the supervisor
led to higher performance ratings and resource provision while
more obvious behaviors such as making the supervisor aware of
one's accomplishments ~ed to lower performance ratings and
resource provision. The skillful gamesman is able to make a
distinction between those likely to be effective and those likely
to backfire. Further, it appears that the supervisor is able to
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make this distinction as well.
LocUS of Control
One individual difference variable seemingly ignored by past
researchers is locus of control. Ferris et al. (1989b) argued,
following Bandura (1977), that those who fundamentally believe
they can change their environment (internal locus of control) may
be more likely to engage in influence behavior. Accordingly,
individuals possessing an internal locus of control would be
expected to be more likely to take the initiative in attempting
to influence the impression others have of them. On the other
hand, those with an external locus of control see themselves as
helpless to external events, and would likely see any effort to
manage impressions or influence others as futile. While the
proposition may seem reasonable, empirical data is needed to test
the hypothesis.
Gender
It is clear that women traditionally have operated from
inferior power positions in most organizations (Kanter, 1977;
Lips, 1981). Ragins and Sundstrom (1989) found that men
consistently had greater access to resources for power (e.g.,
peer networks, mentors) than did women. How this power
difference operates on the use of influence tactics is unclear.
It may be that women, because they are in a weaker position of
power, are more motivated to gain power and use influence tactics
to this end. Ferris et al. (1989b) argued for these very power
reasons that women are more likely to see their work environment
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as political. Although the relationship between politics
perceptions and political behavior is unclear I it would be
unusual for an individual to behave politically in an environment
they perceive as apolitical.
There is some empirical evidence regarding gender effects on
influence behavior. Von Baeyer et ale (1981) found that women
presented themselves in a more feminine manner when the
interviewer possessed such stereotypes about women ("women should
be passive, attractive, not independent, and make coffee"). On
the other hand, Dipboye and Wiley (1977) found that moderately
aggressive female applicants were rated as favorably as
moderately aggressive males, and that passive males and females
were rated equally negatively by college recruiters. From the
perspective of the evaluator, two studies have shown that there
is a self-matching bias in performance ratings. Surprisingly,
however, both studies found that managers rated same sex
subordinates lower than opposite sex subordinates (Izraeli, 1987;
Rose & Stonel 1?78).
Age
Ferris et ale (1990) argued that age was likely to
negatively predict the use of influence tactics. Several studies
have reported that a greater degree of influence behavior is
perceived to take place at higher levels in the organizational
hierarchy '(e.g., Gandz & Murray, 1980; Madison, Allen, Porter,
Renwick, & Mayes, 1980), and one could reasonably assume that
Position in the hierarchy is positively related to age. However,
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research by Kipnis and his colleagues (e.g., Kipnis et al., 1980)
would lead one to infer that different tactics of influence are
employed in different situations and levels in the organization.
Thus, whereas older employees might engage in influence tactics,
it is reasonable that they would engage more in the use of
direct, logical reasoning approaches than using manipulative,
ingratiating types of tactics. However, in the Ferris et ale
(1990) study, age failed to predict the use of either jOb-focused
or supervisor-focused influence tactics.
Consequences of Political Influence for P/HRM Activities
Research recently has begun to examine the role of political
influence in a number of P/HRM activities, including personnel
selection, performance evaluation, promotion and career mobility
systems, the feedback process, and compensation decisions and
activities.
Personnel Selection
Personnel selection has been a rich area for research on
political influence~ A useful way to classify research on
impression management is by who is doing the managing. Most
attention has focused on influence behavior by the applicant,
although there has been some attention to how politics might
affect managerial selection decisions. In general, almost all
research has been conducted on the employment interview. Because
of the face-to-face contact and interpersonal dynamics of the
interview, this is not surprising. Accordingly, much of the
fOllowing review focuses on the interview, although as Knouse
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(1989) pointed out with the letter of recommendation, the
interview is not the only area of the selection process subject
to influence behavior.
Applicant impression manaqement. Practitioners in the
selection area have long recognized that there is a strong
incentive on the part of applicants to actively manage the
impressions selection decision-makers form of them. It has been
a relatively recent development, however, that researchers
investigating selection decisions, particularly the interview,
have systematically examined the effect of impression management
on selection decisions. Some theoretical works have appeared on
the role of impression management in the selection process. For
example, Jones and Pittman (1982) and Tedeschi and Melburg (1984)
developed taxonomies regarding specific types of behaviors
applicants engage in to manage impression in the interview.
Tedeschi and Melburg distinguished between assertive (positively
projecting a strong image) and defensive (excuse-making and
rationalization) influence behaviors. The authors further
distinguished between tactical (short-term) and strategic
(long-term) focused behaviors. One assertive strategic behavior
that has received considerable empirical support is the effect of
physical attractiveness (including grooming and attire) on
interviewer decisions (Beehr & Gilmore, 1982; Cash, 1985;
Dipboye, Arvey, & Terpstra, 1977; Forsythe, Drake, & Cox, 1985;
Gilmore, Beehr, & Love, 1986). Gilmore and Ferris (1989b)
provided an overview of research on this and the other dimensions
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of Tedeschi and Melburg's taxonomy.
It is clear that, in general, impression management by
applicants influences interviewer judgments. Virtually every
study that has examined impression management in the interview
has found an effect. In fact, in a recent study, impression
management techniques were found to have a much more powerful
effect on interviewer judgments than objective qualifications
(Gilmore & Ferris, 1989a).
What may be more important to explore is that different
types of influence tactics appear to lead to different outcomes.
Baron (1989) recognized this when he argued there is a "too much
of a good thing" effect in terms of applicant influence
strategies. While the use of impression management may lead to
higher evaluations, there is a point at which there is overkill.
For example, Baron (1986, 1989) found that both pleasant scent
and being well-dressed improved interview judgments when used
alone, but when used together led to lower evaluations than
causal attire and no scent. Baron's empirical findings are
consistent with what common sense would tell us. For example,
smiling and eye contact has been found to lead to higher
interviewer evaluations of job candidates (Forbes & Jackson,
1980; Imada & Hakel, 1977). However, those individuals that
never cease to smile or continually stare at the interviewer
would obviously not be highly evaluated!
Managing the perceived similarity between the interviewer
and applicant appears to be an important tactic. Baskett (1973),
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Frank and Hackman (1973), and Schmitt (1976) all reported that
similarity between interviewer and interviewee favorably affected
interviewer evaluation of the applicant. Applicant strategies
such as agreeing with comments made by the interviewer to promote
perceived similarity do seem to improve interviewer evaluations
of the applicant. An interesting example of how this similarity
process operates is found in the previously cited work of von
Baeyer et al. (1981). To review, they found that female
applicants attempted to present themselves in a more feminine
manner when they knew the interviewer held traditional
stereotypes of women. Thus, managing similarity may extend to
matching oneself to particular stereotypes.
Interestingly, it appears that, in general, controlling
types of influence tactics (dominance, self-promotion, etc.) lead
to job applicants being more successful in the interview than
applicants who engage in more submissive or passive influence
tactics (Dipboye & Wiley, 1977, 1978; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris,
1990; Tullar, 1989)~ This runs contrary to conventional wisdom
that argues being deferential and tractable to the interviewer is
important. On the contrary, it appears that those who "toot
their own horn" are the ones that get ahead in the interview,
perhaps due to the expectations in this context.
Impression manaqement by selection decision-maker. Up to
this point we have dealt only with the applicant side of
influence behavior. However, it is important to note that the
interviewer or selection decision-maker may also be motivated to
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employ, and in fact actively use, influence tactics. As
indicated earlier, Gilmore and Ferris (1989b) have argued that
managers may prefer individuals similar to themselves. The
motive behind this may be political. Perhaps managers like
individuals similar to themselves because this allows them to
build coalitions and contribute to their own power base. While
this does not imply that managers will actually use influence
tactics in the selection process, it does suggest that political
motives may underlie selection decisions. Wanous (1989) reviewed
several studies that found what recruiters say, and how they say
it, is important in determining whether the applicant accepts or
rejects an offer. The fact that the organizational impressions
interviewers projected consistently influenced applicants job
choices provides a strong incentive for recruiters and
interviewers to use impression management techniques. However,
future research needs to address the extent to which interviewers
actually do so.
Manaqing the impression of fit. The significant
relationship between perceived similarity and interviewer
evaluations was reviewed earlier. Perhaps one of the more
important goals of those using influence tactics in the selection
process is to increase the evaluator's perception of the fit
between the applicant and organization. In concept, this
transcends similarity between the interviewer and interviewee to
similarity between the applicant and the organization's culture.
It may be that the specific influence tactics used depend on the
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situation, but the overall goal of enhancing the perception of
congruence between the characteristics one has to offer and what
the organization values remains the same. Therefore, the notion
of fit may hold the promise of explaining how and why individuals
seek to manage impression in the interview, and the extent to
which they are effective in doing so.
Most writings of fit have been plagued by imprecision,
emphasizing nebulous terms such as "right types" (Klimoski &
strickland, 1977: Schnieder, 1987). Rynes and Gerhart (1990)
have argued that such notions add little to the understanding of
fit. Although it may be nebulous by nature, fit is perhaps best
understood as the degree to which the characteristics
(dispositional and demographic traits, values and goals) of the
applicant or employee match those of employees considered
successful in the organization. Because most interviewers
probably consider themselves successful employees, this may
actually translate into how closely the applicant resembles the
interviewer(s)
.'
The inclusion of fit as a criterion in the selection process
may relate to organizational strategy. By selecting individuals
consistent with overall business strategies, organizational
performance may be enhanced. writers in the strategy area have
argued this to be the case (Gupta, 1986: Hambrick & Mason, 1984:
Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984). A way to implement strategy is by
designing an organization's culture to enhance strategic
objectives (Butler et al., 1991). Firms may select employees who
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manifestly fit the existing culture. Schein (1990) contended
that culture is perpetuated by the selection of new employees who
already have the "right" set of beliefs and values. Similarly,
others have contended that in order for a corporate culture to
flourish, it is important that applicants fit into the existing
value system of the organization (Fombrun, 1983).
Research has demonstrated that the extent to which an
applicant is perceived to fit the job, culture, or organization
substantially increases the applicant's likelihood of receiving a
job offer (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990). Fit may be inherently vague,
which allows it to take a number of forms and permits applicants
to play upon this ambiguity and exercise a greater degree of
influence over the selection process and outcomes. For example,
fit has been viewed as attitude similarity between applicant and
interviewer/evaluator, and such perceived similarity in attitudes
has been associated with more favorable evaluations (e.g.,
decisions to hire) of job applicants (e.g., Peters & Terborg,
1975; Schmitt, 1976).
Fit also has been interpreted with respect to appearance,
personality, and values, and the extent to which each of these is
consistent with some expected or desired level. Molloy (1975)
elevated appearance and dress to a higher level in the role it is
believed to play in interpersonal evaluations including personnel
selection decisions. Recent research has shown that appearance
affects interviewer judgments (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990).
The research on fit reviewed earlier suggested that
I
!
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assessments of fit typically have focused on the personality of
the applicant. Organizations certainly differ in their strategic
mission. since differing strategic missions may require
individuals possessing particular personality traits, it seems
reasonable to expect that overall personality composition of
employees significantly differs by organization. As mentioned
earlier, several writers in the strategy literature have
emphasized that the match between the characteristics of the
individual and the strategic characteristics of the organization
are of central importance in determining organizational success.
For example, an organization that has typically pursued an
aggressive business strategy may be more likely to have
aggressive employees. If so, the organization may desire to hire
aggressive employees in the future. If the applicant perceived
the personality desired, he or she might seek to manage the way
in which his or her personality is perceived. If the
interviewer, for example, presents the impression that
cohesiveness and cooperation is very important to the
organization, the applicant may take particular care not to
appear aggressive or stubborn.
It may be that personality of the interviewer alone is the
dominant effect. The applicant may not be aware of the
personality of the other organization members, only the
interviewer's. If the interviewer displays certain attributes,
the applicant may seek to match the actions that manifest the
traits. The interviewer displaying certain actions makes it more
Political Influence 25
likely that the applicant will act in a reciprocal fashion.
Thus, in such cases, the applicant has effectively managed the
shared meaning of personality similarity and the interviewer may
well recommend hiring due to perceived fit to the job (when it is
actually perceived similarity to himself or herself) . Research
on personality and fit has shown that job applicants that possess
personality characteristics congruent with the job for which they
are being evaluated tend to be judged as more suitable for that
job (paunonen, Jackson, & Oberman, 1987).
Performance Evaluation, Advancements, and Work Interactions
Performance evaluation. Another very important human
resources activity is performance evaluation. Despite the
traditional assumption that performance evaluation operates in a
quite systematic and rational way, leading to accurate and
reliable assessments of "true" performance, this process and its
corresponding outcomes are susceptible to considerable influence
from nonperformance factors and deliberate manipulations by both
evaluators and evaluatees. Ferris, Fedor, Chachere, and Pondy
(1989a) provided a conceptual integration of myth systems and
politics as a way to better appreciate the richness of
intraorganizational contexts. The principal examples used in
their analysis were drawn from the design and implementation of a
performance evaluation system in an organization, and the
Political issues brought to light. It has been found that
performance evaluation and promotion systems (theoretically
linked) frequently are quite political in nature (Longenecker,
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sims, & Gioia, 1987; Longenecker, 1989; Riley, 1983), as was the
case in the Ferris et ale study. As was found in the course of
this intervention, much of what occurred in the performance
evaluation had little to do with the pure accuracy of the
appraisal (Kennedy, 1980).
This issue of the non-performance-based nature of
performance evaluation systems and the context in which they
operate, is an important one and should be pursued further. In
her typology of human resource cultures for professionals, Von
Glinow (1985) suggested that in cultures characterized by a
strong concern for people but weak performance expectations
(i.e., "Caring Culture"), performance evaluations tend not to be
performance-oriented. Rather, non-performance-related criteria
are used, like cooperation, teamwork, and fitting in, and it is
quite likely that individuals would be evaluated on the basis of
effort instead of results. One might argue that the less
objective the performance outcomes of a job, the less sensitive
are performance evaluation systems in detecting differences in
true or actual work performance. Such systems then would tend to
focus on the detection of differences in perceived performance,
which can be influenced by symbolic (or political)
behavior/performance. It is not surprising that in such
situations, people are frequently evaluated on the basis of work
effort or attitude (Pfeffer, 1981a).
As noted earlier, the ambiguous nature of work performance
as one moves upward in the organization's hierarchy provides the
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opportunity for the management of meaning to be effective. As
Nemeth and staw (1989) noted, where performance evaluation and
promotion criteria are vague and ambiguous, surrogate criteria
emerge in the form of conformity to organization norms and the
particular tastes and preferences of one's supervisor. Thus,
according to Nemeth and staw, those seeking favorable performance
reviews and upward advancement in such ambiguous circumstances
can be expected to carefully monitor their environments and
attend to any salient cues regarding supervisor expectations,
preferences, and social approval. Ferris et ale (1989b)
suggested that when performance outcomes are less easily measured
objectively, we tend to focus on employees' behavior rather than
their actual results. Pfeffer (1981a) even argued that in such
ambiguous situations, we tend to evaluate people on the basis of
beliefs, values, and effort. The performance evaluation and
promotion system, according to March (1984), then becomes
essentially a filter that screens people on the basis of similar
attributes (i.e:, perceived similarity to some stereotype, to
existing managers, or to the person making the evaluation), thus
serving to reduce variation and increase homogeneity among
managers in the firm.
It appears then that particularly when performance criteria
are ambiguous and or subjectively evaluated, there is more of an
opportunity for political or opportunistic behavior to occur.
Halaby (1978) suggested that under conditions of high
professionalization, specialization, and functional complexity
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(i.e., nonroutinized), promotion criteria become much more
subjective (perhaps providing more of an opportunity for
individual candidates to exercise influence over such decisions
through politics) . Furthermore, Riley (1983) found evidence of
considerably more political behavior in nonroutinized versus
routinized task environments, particularly noting promotion
systems.
Russ (1990) argued that organizations will use output
control when performance criteria are objective and measurable,
but will shift to behavior control in performance evaluation when
outcome criteria are ambiguous, following from the work of Ouchi
(1977), Ouchi and Maguire (1975), and Thompson (1967). But
rather than a completely deterministic view of control, Russ
suggested that managers not only try to enhance others'
impressions of them, but also try to influence the criteria by
which others judge them. Managers are motivated to protect their
managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Nystrom &
starbuck, 1984)~ Therefore, managers, knowing that owners'
primary interests are in the financial performance of the firm,
but also recognizing that organizational outcomes are affected by
many factors other than their own efforts, should desire that
they be held accountable for performance only to the extent to
which performance is under their control. As uncertainty
increases and controllability decreases, however, managers will
prefer to be evaluated on their behaviors, rather than on
organizational outcomes. Under conditions of extreme uncertainty
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(e.g., environmental threats, jolts, or crises), even behavior
control becomes undesirable. Thompson (1967) noted that as goals
and appropriate behaviors become more ambiguous or uncertain,
preferred measures of firm effectiveness shift to satisfaction of
external constituencies. In other words, as conditions become
more uncertain, external legitimacy becomes more important. In
the highly uncertain environment, Russ argued that managers will
prefer a clan form of control, whereby they are evaluated not on
their outcomes or behaviors, but on their intentions and values,
and that they will attempt to influence external stakeholders'
perceptions of appropriate evaluation criteria through formal
organizational communications (e.g., annual reports, press
release, etc.).
The implications of a shift to behavior and intentions
monitoring, control, and evaluation are important for the
demonstration of political behavior in several ways, including
through goal setting. Clan and behavior control suggests that
people are eval~ated on the bases of their norms, beliefs, and
values, and perhaps their intentions and effort as well. These
are all behaviors or attitudinal indicators that are subjectively
determined and thus prone to potential distortion through active
political or opportunistic efforts of subordinates (i.e.,
individuals being evaluated). Pfeffer (1981a) quoted George
Gallup as saying: "People tend to judge a man by his goals, by
what he is trying to do, and not necessarily by how well he
sUcceeds" (p. 78). Some research has reported results consistent
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with this notion. Dossett and Greenberg (1981) found that
supervisors gave higher performance ratings to workers who set
higher goals than to those who set lower goals, regardless of
their actual performance. One might suggest, in light of these
notions, that employees might utilize the goal setting process
proactively to manage the supervisors' impression that they are
ambitious, hard workers, and so forth. Ferris and Porac (1984)
tested the notion that the presence of an evaluative observer
influences how workers set task goals. They found support for
the dual contention that although self-set goals are inflated in
the presence of an evaluative observer, such inflation was not
associated with an increase in subsequent performance. So, it
seems goal setting, (i.e., self-set goals) can be a mechanism for
subordinates to nonverbally communicate information to, and thus
manage impression of, superiors. Besides communicating high
effort, ambition, and so forth, as the Ferris and Porac study
implied, Greenberg (1983) examined goal setting as a
self-handicapping strategy. The choice of an extremely difficult
performance goal allowed individuals to externalize outcomes that
might otherwise threaten their self-images, and provided a
readily available excuse for poor performance. Further work
needs to be conducted to examine the notion that goals can be set
publicly for reasons other than self-direction. Recently, Huber,
Latham, and Locke (1989) have further examined the role of
Political influence in goal setting.
Because the evaluation of performance in many jobs is not
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amenable to objective assessment and quantification, we find that
subjective performance rating by s~pervisors typically
incorporate a variety of nonperformance factors, thus leading to
a violation of the most sacred principle of performance
evaluation: that we are evaluating performance, not the person
in the abstract. The violation of this fundamental principle
suggests that factors such as liking, perceived similarity in
values, beliefs, and attitudes, and fit may well explain much of
the content of performance ratings in organizations. Wayne and
Ferris (1990), for example, found that impression management
tactics of subordinates contributed to increased liking by the
supervisor which led the supervisor to rate the subordinate's job
performance more favorably. Graen (1989) suggested that perhaps
the most important characteristic bosses look for in
subordinates, which leads to these subordinates being evaluated
more positively and achieving in-group status, is the extent to
which the subordinates think like the boss, make similar
decisions, and support the boss on matters of importance to him
or her. Furthermore, attitudinal similarity was found by Ross
and Ferris (1981) to be associated with higher performance
evaluations. These all appear to be characteristics or behaviors
that are easily manipulated.
Several other studies have found a relationship between
POlitical influence tactics and performance evaluations.
Greenberg (1984) suggested that employees inflate performance
evaluations and use as a self-serving strategy, and Kipnis and
Political Influence 32
schmidt (1988) reported that supervisor ratings of subordinate
performance are affected differentially by the type of influence
tactic subordinates employ. Ferris, Judge, and Rowland (1990)
and Wayne and Ferris (1990) added to these findings by
demonstrating that supervisor-focused influence tactics (e.g.,
ingratiation, etc.) led to subordinates receiving higher
performance ratings, but job-focused tactics (e.g., self-
promotion) led to lower ratings. Wayne and Kacmar (in press)
conducted a laboratory experiment to test the effects of
subordinate political influence tactics on both supervisor
ratings of subordinate performance and supervisor verbal
communication in performance appraisal interviews. Their results
supported the favorable effects of influence tactics on both
outcomes.
Earlier, Kipnis and Vanderveer (1971) found that a
subordinate who engaged in ingratiation received highly positive
performance ratings. contrary to these findings, Fodor (1973a,
1973b, 1974) fo~nd that an ingratiator did not receive higher
performance ratings in comparison to a noningratiator. In an
attempt to explain these contradictory findings, Fodor
acknowledged that the ingratiating messages he used were perhaps
overly or blatantly ingratiating. This makes sense in light of
the notion that as long as intent is disguised or made to appear
positive, influence attempts may be effective. However, if the
target interprets the attempt as a conscious effort to
manipulate, they likely will react negatively. Thus, as argued
Political Influence 33
bY Baron (1986, 1989), political influence attempts can backfire
if taken to an extreme.
The foregoing discussion has provided evidence in support of
the effectiveness of subordinate political influence tactics on
supervisor ratings of subordinate performance, and clearly
further research is needed in this area to more precisely
delineate the differential effectiveness of a broad array of
influence attempts. In addition, however, it is important to
note that political influence can generate from the supervisor as
well as the subordinate in the performance evaluation process.
Research has shown that supervisors may approach the performance
evaluation process with personal agenda, and assign performance
ratings not on the basis of "real" performance, but rather as a
way to maximize their own self interests (e.g., Longenecker,
1989; Longenecker et al., 1987; Martocchio & Ferris, in press;
villanova & Bernardin, 1989). Much more research is needed in
this area to expand upon existing findings and extend our
understanding o~ the political rater, as well as the political
ratee. Related to this, Greenberg (1~88, 1990) has argued that
actual fairness or justice is of much less concern to managers
than insuring that they manage the impression or image of
fairness.
Another area of performance evaluation systems where
meanings and the interpretation of outcomes can be manipulated
Concerns the sources of evaluation, and the increased use of
subordinate self evaluations used in conjunction with supervisor
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evaluations of the subordinate's performance. The primary focus
of both research and practice on self evaluation has concentrated
on the extent to which employees are accurate self assessors
(Ashford, 1989). A basic assumption about self evaluation, which
has probably slowed progress in this area, was that if employees
are allowed to evaluate themselves, they will inflate their
ratings. In fact, existing research has shown some tendency, on
the part of subordinates, to rate themselves lower (not higher)
than their supervisors rate them. Such findings can be
interpreted in different ways. One interpretation is that when
subordinates are given this responsibility they take it seriously
and carry it out conscientiously in an effort to provide the most
accurate evaluation possible. An alternative interpretation is
that subordinates use the self evaluations as an impression
management strategy to create a particular impression of
themselves for the supervisor. In fact, Teel (1978) argued that
subordinates may consciously rate their performance lower in
order to gain the praise of the supervisor. Subordinates who
convey the impression of being unduly self critical likely find
this strategy to be more effective and instrumental in achieving
positive evaluations from the supervisor than employing a
strategy of inflated ratings. We would likely impute the
characteristic of humility to the former and egoism to the later,
and we are socialized to react more favorably to a humble person
than an arrogant one.
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Advancement. mobility. and career proqress. Related to
performance evaluation activities are the processes involved in
intraorganizational mobility; that is, promotions, advancement,
and career progress within organizations. In this area, as well,
some research has investigated the role of political influence.
pfeffer and Cohen (1984) suggested that the study of internal
labor markets should direct its focus on power and influence as
key determinants. Furthermore, a number of authors have
concluded that promotion systems in organizations can be quite
political (e.g., Dyke, 1990; Ferris & Buckley, 1990; Ferris et
al., 1989b; Ferris et al., in press; Markham, Hackett, & Harlan,
1987; Riley, 1983), and in the area of management succession,
considerable anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that the
succession process and decisions are highly political in nature
(e.g., Brady & Helmich, 1984; Rowan, 1983; Vance, 1983).
Alternatives to career success, leading to mobility, seem to
exist and involve strategies that may be viewed as more political
or image-focusep than substantive or performance-focused. For
example, visibility and exposure (Jennings, 1971), networking
(Gould & Penley, 1984), and image building (Heissler & Gemmill,
1978; Larwood & Gattiker, 1983) have been found to bring success
in careers. However, Greenhaus (1987) has suggested that career
strategies may be differentially effective as a function of a
number of factors, such as the norms and practices of the
particular organization (Van Maanen, 1980), the nature of the
industry (Larwood & Gattiker, 1983), and the type of job or
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occupation (Gould & Penley, 1984). Beehr, Taber, and Walsh
(1980) investigated employee perceptions of organizational
mobility and found that political influence in the form of
favoritism was viewed as a prominent mobility channel. Finally,
pfeffer (1989) has recently offered a political perspective on
careers and intraorganizational processes that facilitate or
hinder mobility.
Supervisor-subordinate interactions. Before leaving this
topic, some recent work in two other areas needs to be noted that
relates to performance evaluation and advancement. The quality
of the supervisor-subordinate working relationship has been a
topic of considerable interest to researchers over the years, but
recently it has been examined relative to the role of political
influence (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Liden & Mitchell, 1989). A
couple of empirical studies have reported evidence in support of
the role of political influence in such contexts. Ansari and
Kapoor (1987) found that student subjects (playing the role of
subordinates) reported a willingness and likelihood of using
ingratiation tactics directed at their supervisor in order to
obtain personal benefits such as career advancement. Also, Wayne
and Ferris (1990) found that political influence tactics and
performance level affected supervisor-subordinate exchange
quality through effects on liking and performance ratings.
Feedback processes. A final related area of recent research
activity on political influence concerns the feedback process.
In a recent conceptualization, Fedor (1991) noted that political
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influence is now generally recognized as an important element in
the feedback process. Recent work by several researchers in this
area has suggested the various ways political influence dynamics
play out in the feedback process (Ashford & Tsui, 1989; Eder &
Fedor, 1989; Quinn & Farr, 1989; Wolfe, 1989). Because the
situation in which feedback is received can generate considerable
uncertainty and anxiety, Fedor (1991) noted that it is ripe for
political influence efforts to emerge. Eder and Fedor (1989)
have suggested that feedback recipients are likely to formulate
strategies which are designed to influence the attributions made
by the source (i.e., supervisor) for good or poor performance,
strategies found by Wood and Mitchell (1981) to be used by
subordinates under conditions of poor performance. Clearly, more
research is needed to investigate how political influence
strategies are employed in the feedback process. A neglected
issue, and one worthy of more precise theoretical and empirical
development, concerns the potential ways supervisors might use
feedback as a P9litical influence tactic to maximize their own
self interest. That is, one typically assumes that a supervisor
provides feedback to a subordinate in order to be helpful or
assist in bringing about some change in behavior. This, of
course, further assumes that the subordinate is the intended
target of this effort. It might well be the case that, in such
instances, supervisors are "playing to a different audience";
Opportunistically, they might be simply "going through the
motions" in publicly exhibiting a good supervisory behavior that
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will win them favor with their superiors.
In summary, it appears that the intentional management of
shared meaning can be played out quite effectively in
organizations through the personnel selection, performance
evaluation, intraorganizational mobility, and feedback processes.
The ambiguous work environmental context regarding both requisite
selection criteria and performance indicators provide substantial
opportunity for the management of impressions and shared meaning
by organizational actors. But these performances rely upon a
basic principle of social behavior for their effective execution.
That principle is that similarity (perceived or actual) leads to
attraction. Byrne (1969) suggested that agreement or perceived
similarity leads to attraction because it increases one's
confidence that his or her opinions or beliefs are correct.
Furthermore, as noted by Nemeth and staw (1989), ambiguity
contributes to uniformity or consensus in beliefs because
individuals actively seek consensus in their opinions of
ambiguous events.
Compensation
A couple of recent conceptual pieces reviewing two important
areas of compensation decisions and systems, merit pay and pay
satisfaction, emphasize the role political influence may play in
compensation research. Miceli and Lane (1991), in reviewing the
antecedents of pay satisfaction, indicated that some employees
receive higher pay for reasons other than merit, seniority, and
So forth. One of the factors the authors identified that might
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explain this was political behavior. Some employees may believe
the avenue to higher pay is paved with influence behavior. In
the same manner that individuals manage impressions to enhance
their performance rating (ingratiation, looking busy, etc.), they
may also use influence tactics to obtain higher merit raises.
The authors further argued that political behavior may lead to
lower pay satisfaction because of this, particularly for those
who do not receive rewards for political behavior.
Heneman (1990), in his review of the determinants of merit
pay, also reinforced the potential importance of political
behavior in compensation. He noted that the relationship between
human capital characteristics and merit pay is low. Heneman
contended that this relationship might be higher when recipients
emphasize the salience and importance of the characteristics to
the allocation decision. This is a very interesting possibility.
In effect, Heneman was suggesting an interaction between human
capital and impression management. If the individual has low
human capital, impression management will not matter ("you can't
sew a silk purse out of a sow's ear"). On the other hand, for
those with high human capital, their superior characteristics and
accomplishments may go unnoticed unless they make efforts to
point them out to their superiors.
While the above authors have laid out a conceptual basis for
impression management in compensation, some empirical work
provides evidence regarding the role of political influence in
Compensation decisions and outcomes. Dreher, Dougherty, and
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Whitely (1988) found that upward influence tactics explained a
significant amount of the variance in salaries for both men and
women, although the effectiveness of specific tactics varied by
gender. For men, bargaining tactics resulted in higher salaries.
For women, use of reason and logic led to higher salaries, but
use of bargaining tactics led to lower salaries.
Gould and Penley (1984) also found that influence behavior
was significantly related to salary progression (although no
gender differences were investigated). Specifically, the authors
found that opinion conformity and other enhancements related to
salary progression. Also, Bartol and Martin (1990) found that
political connections were instrumental in achieving higher pay
raises, but only when the subordinate made a dependency threat.
Kipnis and Schmitt (1988) found differences in the political
orientation of individuals. "shotgun" subordinates (emphasizing
assertiveness and bargaining) earned significantly less than
"tactician" subordinates (average amount of influence use and
emphasizing rea~on). Freedman (1978), on the other hand, found
that strength of the demand for a raise +ed to higher raises.
These two findings might be reconciled in that "shotguns" do not
know when to stop being assertive--being overly assertive may be
illustrative of Baron's (1989) "too much of a good thing" effect.
Freedman's study was only concerned with merit pay decisions. If
the people who strongly demanded raises demanded everything else
as well (as "shotguns" would do), it could be that their
sUpervisorbecomes disgusted with them and allocates them less.
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This creates an interesting possibility for future research.
While the above studies suggest a strong relationship
between compensation decisions and outcomes and impression
management, several studies suggest the contrary. Ross and
Ferris (1981) found that attitude similarity between employee and
supervisor did not significantly predict salary. The authors
findings could be explained by the possibility that self-report
attitudes of subordinates may not match with what the supervisor
thinks an employee believes. Further, those that manage
impressions are unlikely to let the supervisor know what they
really think if they believe their supervisor disagrees. This
makes quite crucial the authors' failing to measure supervisor's
knowledge of (or lack thereof) subordinate beliefs. Martin
(1987) found that influence attempts were not significantly
better than no action in obtaining pay raises, although an
inequity complaint was significantly more successful than
ingratiation behaviors.
Several studies have investigated political influences on
reward decisions from the perspective of the allocator. Ferris
et al. (1989b) suggested that allocators may grant high ratings
and large merit increases to recipients in order to convey the
impression to the allocator's superiors that the allocators have
done an effective job of managing the recipients. Confirming the
contention of Ferris et al., Bartol and Martin (1988) found that
self-interests of reward allocators influenced reward allocation
decisions. Like Ferris et al., Bartol and Martin contended that
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reward allocation is used by managers to increase their influence
in organizations. Further supporting evidence comes from
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) who found that CEO pay was
significantly influenced by the power of the CEO. While not
explicitly relating to the use of influence tactics, it does
suggest that the degree of influence of individuals is likely to
affect the compensation they draw. Finally, Benson and Hornsby
(1988) found that influence tactics were present in job
evaluation committees, suggesting that job evaluators may issue
ratings based on a political agenda.
Department- and organization-Level Political Influence
Whereas much of the foregoing review, analysis, and
discussion has focused primarily on the individual-level of
analysis in political influence efforts, some work also has been
done that examines political influence at department, unit, or
group levels, and at the organization level. Russ (1990) has
shown how organizations attempt to shape reality for their
constituency, a~d thus enhance their image, through symbolic use
of formal communications. In addition to research by Russ
(1990), others have shown that organizations make active efforts
to manage the impressions of their major constituencies
concerning the organizations' performance (Bettman & Weitz, 1983;
Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983).
Somewhat related to this work are several efforts aimed at
providing a better understanding of how organizations seek to
establish, as well as re-establish, legitimacy, employing various
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means including symbolic communication and political influence
(e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; King, 1991).
Bacharach and Lawler (1980), among others, have directed
their interests in political influence at the group, unit, or
department level. Also, recent work by Frost (1989), Russ (1986)
and Martocchio and Ferris (in press) has adopted this same level
of analysis in exploring the potential implications of political
influence in the P/HRM function's efforts to increase its
perceived importance and contribution.
It seems clear that much more work is needed at both group-
and organization-levels of analysis directed at developing a
better understanding of such political influence dynamics. Of
particular interest is the improved image, status, and importance
of the P/HRM function in organizations today (e.g., Butler et
al., 1991; Rowland & Ferris, 1982), and the question concerning
to what extent that improved image is a function of purely
substantive contributions versus how much is the result of active
and successful ,sYmbolic/political influence strategies employed
~~HRM.
Perceptions of Political Influence
The major focus of this review has been directed at the
nature of political influence and how it affects important P/HRM
decisions and activities. studies reviewed have investigated the
effects of political influence on the personnel selection
process, performance evaluations, promotion systems,
intraorganizational mobility and career advancement, feedback
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processes, and compensation decisions. In addition, research has
shown that political influence tactics or behaviors can be seen
as reactions to stress (Mayes & Ganster, 1988) and job
dissatisfaction (Farrell, 1983).
A small but growing body of theory and research has
considered a slightly different perspective on political
influence which has focused on perceptions of politics. The
question of interest here seems to be what are the antecedents
and consequences of an individual perceiving their work
environment as being political? This area is quite pertinent to
our present discussion of P/HRM decisions and activities because
the very nature of how those activities and decisions are carried
out (not just their outcomes, but the process as well) would be
expected to influence employee perceptions of political activity.
Unfortunately, little work to date has been published other than
recent theoretical and empirical efforts by Ferris and his
colleagues (Ferris et al., 1989a, 1989b; Ferris & Kacmar, 1989;
Ferris, Gilmoret & Kacmar, 1990; Kacmar & Ferris, in press;
Wayne, Kacmar, & Ferris, 1989), and several other empirical
studies (Gandy & Murray, 1980; Madison et al., 1980). This area
of research is a bit different than the other two because it
suggests that organizational politics is a subjective perception,
not necessarily an objective reality. While one would assume
that typically there is a strong correspondence between actual
POlitical behavior (i.e., to the extent that an indication of
"objective" political behavior could be obtained) and behavior
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that is perceived as political, it must be acknowledged that
perceptual differences occur and it is important to try to better
understand how and why this happens.
organizational scientists have long argued the distinction
between objective and perceived work environments (e.g., James &
Jones, 1974; Naylor, Pritchard, & lIgen, 1980; Schneider, 1975).
More recently, arguments have been made that work environments
are molded by the types of people attracted and granted entry
(schneider, 1987), that both selection and socialization
processes contribute to political environments (Ferris et al.,
1989a, 1989b), and that some organizational environments are more
political than others (Riley, 1983).
However, in this area of research, the perspective was first
articulated by Gandz and Murray (1980), who suggested that rather
than an objective state, organizational politics is best
conceived as a state of mind. Many years ago, Lewin (1936)
suggested the very important notion that people respond on the
basis of their perceptions of reality, not reality per se, and
later on, Porter (1976) argued that perceptions are important to
study and to understand, even if they are misperceptions of
actual events, with particular reference to organizational
politics. Furthermore, researchers interested in other aspects
of work environments (e.g., organizational climate), in
discussing true versus perceived attributes, have argued for a
definition of work environments based on perceived attributes
(James & James, 1989; Naylor et al., 1980; Schneider, 1975).
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In summary, then, the interest here is to conceptualize and
investigate the nature of perceptions of political influence.
Themes and issues emerge from existing theory and research
concerning just what constitutes political influence in
organizations. Researchers here are interested in the cognitive
evaluation and subjective experience of those behaviors and
events occurring in the work environment that seem to constitute
political behavior. The only conceptual model of politics
perceptions known has been proposed recently by Ferris et ale
(1989b) . However, this conceptualization should serve as merely
a starting point in moving toward a more comprehensive and
precise model and understanding of how perceptions of political
influence actually operate. Also, such comprehensive and precise
efforts in this area should lead to a clearer picture of exactly
how P/HRM decisions and activities affect perceptions of
organizational politics.
Future Considerations
The purpose ot this Yearly Review was to examine the field
of P/HRM from a political influence perspective as an effort to
expand upon our understanding of the underlying dynamics of P/HRM
decisions and activities in organizations. As noted in the
foregoing sections of this article, some research has been
conducted in this broad area, but both theoretical and empirical
developments are seriously needed. In this final section,
several observations are made regarding both challenging issues
facing this area, as well as future directions for research.
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Whereas it was not the intention of this review to resolve
the definitional problem for the political influence construct,
this does pose a challenge for future research. In reviewing the
research examining political influence in addition to the
definitions cited, several issues seem to emerge and can be
coll~ctively organized in an effort to develop a more informed
understanding of the political influence construct. First, there
appears to be an assumption of intentionality in the
- demonstration of political behavior. While this may be a less
critical issue for some, we believe it is important for how
perceivers cognitively evaluate the observed event (i.e., the
political behavior eXhibited).
A second issue emerging from the existing evidence pertains
to level of analysis. It appears that political behavior is
demonstrated by individuals, groups, and organizations.
Furthermore, Ferris et ale (1989b) argued that because similar
types of political behaviors are likely used by individuals,
groups, and org~nizations, they saw no particular theoretical
advantage at present in distinguishing among the various levels
in their definition of organizational politics. While within-
level research on political influence should continue at all
three levels, such proposed cross-level similarities in specific
types of behaviors and tactics should only help in developing a
more general, multi-level theory of political influence in
organizations.
A third notion that can be extracted is that the very nature
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of political influence reflects a social influence process, both
in terms of the conditions under which political behaviors are
likely to occur (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Ferris & Mitchell, 1987;
Ferris & Porac, 1984, Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblibici, 1976), and
the actual demonstration and consequences of such behavior (Allen
et al., 1979; Ferris et al., 1989b; Porter et al., 1981).
Finally, a fourth issue concerns the extent to which
political behavior is necessarily good or bad. In general, it is
fair to say that individuals tend to interpret the term
"organizational politics" negatively, perhaps due to the
imputation of malintent to the individual engaging in such
behaviors. However, the existing theory and research would imply
that politics can be either good or bad, in perception and
outcome. Of course, the more precise issue is "good or bad for
whom"; the individual? the group? the organization? The
positive or negative organizational consequences of political
influence have been explored in only a limited fashion, with
conflicting arguments resulting. Pfeffer (1981b) has suggested
that political influence is necessary for organizations to
survive and be effective, while Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988)
found that political influence was associated with the poor-
performing, not the high-performing firms in their sample.
Related to this last issue is the work being done on
perceptions of political influence. The issue of how "objective"
political influence attempts are perceived by others and thus the
subjectively experienced meaning of organizational politics
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perceptions bears more careful examination in future theory and
research. One might necessarily assume that what are regarded
"objectively" as political behaviors necessarily will be regarded
as such and lead to negative perceptions and consequences for
bystanders. Wayne, Kacmar, and Ferris (1989) investigated how
subordinate influence attempts directed at a supervisor would
affect coworkers in the work group. Interestingly, the
ingratiation efforts of the subordinate (directed toward the
supervisor) affected coworkers favorably, not unfavorably as one
might expect, leading to increased satisfaction. While these
results might appear counterintuitive, they make more sense upon
closer examination. As Wayne et ale pointed out, observing a
subordinate exhibiting influence tactics toward a supervisor may
well be construed as manipulative by onlookers, but the term
"manipulative" has two quite different definitions as mentioned
by Owen (1986). In citing Webster's Seventh dictionary, he
presented the following two definitions: (1) "manage or utilize
skillfully"; (2) "to control or play upon as artful, unfair, or
insidious means." Thus, it appears that one might react
positively or negatively depending on which definition they
employ. Furthermore, the triggering mechanism that might
determine which definition of manipulation one adopts might be
the particular type of influence tactics employed by the actor.
All political behaviors are neither equally effective nor
similarly perceived. It has been found that ingratiation types
of political behaviors tend to be positively associated with
1
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performance ratings given by supervisors (Ferris et al., 1990;
Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971), likely operating on such outcomes
through their effects on affect or liking. Whereas, other types
of political behaviors that emphasize entitlements (i.e.,
claiming responsibility for positive events) can be risky because
the manipulator may be perceived as egotistical, thus leading to
a negative impression and negative affect (Tedeschi & Melburg,
1984) . In fact, such tactics have been found to be inversely
related to performance ratings (Ferris et al., 1990; Wayne &
Ferris, 1990; Wayne & Kacmar, in press).
Further refinements in the analysis of organizational
politics perceptions, their meaning, and their underlying
dynamics have been suggested recently. Ferris et al. (1989b)
argued that whether politics perceptions lead to negative or
positive outcomes is a function of whether they are perceived as
a threat (i.e., to fear and be intimidated by) or as an
opportunity on which to capitalize. Essentially, this
perspective would suggest that individuals cognitively evaluate
such situations in terms of whether the particular work
environmental features or activities (i.e., in this case,
politics) are personally detrimental or personally beneficial,
and subsequent affect and behavior follow from that initial
cognitive evaluation. ~his is precisely the point that James and
James (1989) made recently in their analysis of work environment
perceptions.
As we have seen, organizational politics is a complex
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multidimensional construct, and one which is in desperate need of
more precise insight and articulation. We provided an analysis
of how shared meaning is manipulated as providing the background
in which politics are played out in P/HRM activities in an effort
to add to our understanding of this complex process. Continued
efforts are needed to better establish the definition, limits,
and construct validity of political influence before major
advances will be made in understanding how political influence
affects P/HRM.
A number of methodological problems need to be considered
and addressed in future research investigating political
influence in P/HRM. One is the potential social desirability
bias inherent in research on "sensitive topics." That is,
positivity response bias is likely to result when research
participants are asked questions regarding the extent to which
they engage in political behaviors; primarily because most people
perceive "politics" in the pejorative sense. Alternative, or
multiple, sourc~s should be considered. Judge (1990), for
example, used "significant other" evaluations in tandem with
self-report evaluations of the focal employee's disposition.
Such an approach might be well-suited for research on political
influence individual differences and behaviors as well.
A second problem concerns the nearly exclusive use of cross-
sectional research designs in this area. Yet, it appears that we
will only begin to really understand how political influence
effects promotions, intraorganizational mobility, and career
-,
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advancement when we start conducting longitudinal research.
A third issue in need of being addressed is to consider the
possibility of not simply linear, but also curvilinear
relationships between political influence tactics and P/HRM
decisions and outcomes. If the "blatant" influence attempts
suggested by Fodor (1974), and the "too much of a good thing"
notion of Baron (1986, 1989) do, in fact, backfire, we need to
test for curvilinearity and identify the inflection in the curve.
A fourth and much more difficult problem is to address the
"form versus substance" issue (Ferris & King, 1990), and begin to
better understand and more precisely articulate the performance
construct. Clearly, the very essence of performance evaluation
systems, which serve as the basis for many important P/HRM
decisions, necessitates and assumes that work performance is an
objective reality, which can be accurately observed and
evaluated. Even assuming such a fixed target, the predictive
validities obtained using various instruments and measures to
predict work performance tend not to be overly impressive. The
foregoing discussion of active political influence attempts by
employees designed to manage impressions of their performance
Thus, efforts need to be made
reality, thatsuggests, instead of a fixed target
performance becomes a moving target and ially constructed
reality. tter define the
nature of job performance for a variety of d'fferent jobs in
which objective, quantifiable criteria are n t available.
Compounding this problem of performance meas rement is the rapid
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movement or fast track philosophies of many organizations. A
fast track system involving quick movement potentially encourages
at least as m~ch sYmbolic behavior (perhaps political in nature)
as actual effective performance. Because one is in a particular
job or position a reasonably short period of time, and because
standards of performance on such jobs are ambiguous at best,
individuals are likely to be evaluated more on how much it
appears that they are contributing than on the basis of their
actual (objective) performance level (Pfeffer, 1981a).
Thompson, Kirkham, and Dixon (1985) also have discussed the
potentially dysfunctional consequences of a fast track system.
They argued that such a system forces managers to focus on
engaging in highly visible activities that produce dramatic
results, and in the shortest possible time frame. It seems that
rapid movement through a series of jobs does not permit enough
time in grade to develop one's skills and competencies to the
fullest, thus raising serious questions concerning the long-term
contributions being made by people in such a system.
Furthermore, because the very nature of the system seems to
encourage perhaps more sYmbolic and political behavior than
substantive contribution, the performance construct will likely
remain obscure and open to manipulation and distortion.
The nature of political influence in PjHRM decision contexts
represents an important area that we've just begun to delve into,
but which is in need of much more theory and research. In fact,
it seems that theory and research in this area have lagged
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considerably behind the practical realization that political
influence is a fact of life in organizations, and operates to
affect key P/HRM activities (e.g., Graen, 1989: Jackall, 1983,
1988: Kanter, 1977; Kanter & Mirvis, 1989; Kelly, 1988: Kennedy,
1980: Maccoby, 1978). The characterization of interpersonal
political interactions, by Goffman (1959), as actors playing out
scripted roles on a stage also has been employed by Schlenker
(1980), and more recently by Ferris et al. (in press) as applied
to the P/HRM context. It seems that a major challenge for P/HRM
theory and research is to develop a more informed understanding
of the roles being played by organizational actors (scripted and
improvisational), as well as the stage on which the performances
take place, if we are to contribute meaningfully to our knowledge
base concerning the dynamics of political influence in P/HRM
decisions and activities. The political influence perspective,
thus, appears to offer considerable potential for P/HRM theory
and research.
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